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LEGAL ASPECTS OF FLORIDA MUNICIPAL
BOND FINANCING
GILES

J.

PATTERSON*

The phrase "municipal financing" is generally used to describe the
process by which public corporations borrow money and issue written
instruments. Various names are given to such instruments, but the
word "bonds" will be used throughout this article in a generic sense
as including all kinds. The Supreme Court of Florida has so construed the word "bonds" as it is used in Article IX, Section 6, of our
Constitution."
Most bonds are issued to obtain capital funds with which to pay
the cost of constructing public improvements.2 Legal problems are
inherent in every such transaction, because the power of the state and
its subdivisions to issue bonds depends primarily upon the legal
provisions in or the absence of legal provisions from the state constitution. Usually that power is hedged about with limitations and
restrictions regarded as necessary to protect taxpayers and citizens
against abuses that experience has taught result from the absence of
them. 3 Among these are restrictions on the purposes for which bonds
*The author expresses his indebtedness for extensive work on the footnotes
and for consultation on the text to WILLIAm H. ADAMS III, A.B. 1947, LL.B. 1950,
Duke University; Order of Coif, 1950; Member of the Jacksonville, Florida, Bar.
'In one of its earliest cases the Florida Supreme Court observed: "And what
is a State bond but a promise to pay the principal and interest of its debts,
equally binding upon us, whether it be in the form of a bond or an open indebtedness?" Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587, 611 (1874). Cf. State v. Florida State
Imp'vt Comm'n, 47 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1950); Kathleen Citrus Land Co. v. Lakeland,
124 Fla. 659, 169 So. 356 (1936); Leon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666
(1936); Sholtz v. McCord, 112 Fla. 248, 150 So. 234 (1933); State ex rel. Davis v.
Green, 95 Fla. 117, 116 So. 66 (1928).
21t was early decided in Florida that bonds may not be issued to pay current
governmental expenses, Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587 (1874).
3The power of the Legislature to authorize the issuance of bonds would be
unlimited in the absence of such restrictions. The nature of this power and the
limiting function of the Florida Constitution was aptly described in the following
statement by Strum, J., speaking for the Court in Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 17,
126 So. 308, 315 (1930): "In approaching the question of power of the legislature
... it should further be borne in mind that our State Constitution is not a grant
of power to the legislature, but is a limitation voluntarily imposed by the people
themselves upon their inherent law making power ... which power would other-
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may be issued, limitations upon the maximum amount of debt, and
conditions precedent to issuance, such as approval at an election. 4
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF BOND OBLIGATIONS

Most constitutional provisions require judicial interpretation, and
those in the Florida Constitution relating to municipal finance are no
exception. Furthermore, they have been amended in so many respects
that today the meaning of the original instrument must be determined
in the light of the amendments. Unfortunately, however, our Supreme
Court has not always been consistent either in its interpretation of
the provisions relating to municipal finance or in its application
of those sections to the differing circumstances of the cases presented
to it. This occasional faltering has served to create difficulties for
issuing authorities in designing a method of financing a particular
project and in solving the accompanying practical problems.
Since 1870 our Court has been remarkably consistent in its application of the doctrine, or legal principle, of estoppel by recitals in
bonds, as well as in its strict adherence to and enforcement of Section
75.09 of Florida Statutes 1951,5 which declares that a decree in such
a proceeding" . .. shall be forever conclusive as to matters adjudicated
against the petitioner [the issuing authority] and all parties affected
thereby . . ." in any proceeding brought to enforce payment of the
obligations; and "shall never be called in question in any court."6
wise be absolute save as it transcended the powers granted by the State to the
Federal Government."
4The principal restrictions on the public issue of 'bonds are contained in
FLA. CONsT. Art. IX, §6, as amended Nov. 4, 1930: "The Legislature shall have
power to provide for issuing State bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion
or suppressing insurrection, and the Counties, Districts or Municipalities of the
State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have
been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority
of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts,
or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by
law; but the provisions of this act shall not apply to the refunding of bonds
issued exclusively for the purpose of refunding of the bonds or the interest thereon
of such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities." Note that a majority of a majority
is prescribed. Art. IX, §16, in effect makes an exception to the above provisions
and enables the Board of Administration to issue bonds payable out of the 80%
surplus gasoline tax.
sSec. 4 of the State Validation Act.
6The Court's solicitude for bondholders and its reluctance to invalidate bonds
in the hands of innocent holders were demonstrated forcefully in Columbia County
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The few exceptions to this general statement are of two types: decisions holding bonds void before validation and therefore not affecting the rights of holders, and decisions declaring that bonds already
validated, or the proceedings authorizing them, violate some express
provision of the Constitution.8 Decisions of this latter type are inescapable under our system of government, in which our Constitution
is the supreme law, unchangeable except by the people who adopted
it. In a few cases in which bonds were held void the Court, because
of special circumstances, granted some form of relief to the holders.
In one case a creditor was given a lien upon specific property, out
of which payment might be enforced. 9
This consistent record of the Court is the more striking because
until about the turn of the century Florida's economy was that of a
pioneer or frontier community, and, as with other states with a developing economy, Florida passed rapidly from alternate periods of
inflation into periods of deflation, and vice versa. Despite this flux
the consistency of the decisions is substantially unbroken. Even during
the local depression that followed the real estate boom of the 1920's
and its continuance and deepening during the long period of the
national depression that followed, the pattern of these decisions remained unchanged despite strenuous efforts by issuing authorities
and taxpayers to obtain relief by judicial decree from the burden of
excessive debt. As one judge orally expressed it, "This court has determined that repudiation of debt shall not be accomplished by decree
of court."
The number of cases involving problems of municipal law decided by our Supreme Court during the depression exceeds the number
v. King, 13 Fla. 4-51 (1870) (purchasers of bonds to finance county's subscription
to railroad stock, relying on Cotten v. Leon County, 6 Fla. 610 (1856), protected
despite Court's view that these bonds had been issued and proceeds used in
violation of Constitution). The first case holding that factual recitals in bonds
concerning compliance with conditions precedent to valid issuance were conclusive
on the government was Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla. 980 (1884).
7
See, e.g., Jacksonville v. Renfroe, 102 Fla. 512, 136 So. 254 (1931); and Weinberger v. Board of Pub. Instr., 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253 (1927) (both involving
injunctions against issue of bonds after validation).
SState v. Belleair, 125 Fla. 669, 170 So. 434 (1936); State ex rel. Nuveen v.
Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924); Munroe v. Reeves, 71 Fla. 612, 71 So. 922
(1916); Holland v. State, 15 Fla. 455 (1876). But cf. Sanders v. City of Coleman,
143 Fla. 455, 196 So. 822 (1940).
oSpecial Tax School Dist. No. I v. Hillman, 131 Fla. 725, 179 So. 805 (1938)
(vendor of land to school district awarded unpaid vendor's lien after purchase
money mortgage from district to him declared void).
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of cases involving that subject decided by any other state court of
last resort during a comparable period of time.
Settlement of all bonds and coupons that defaulted during the
depression was finally effected, in many instances by negotiations
between representatives of bondholders and local officials, and in
others through proceedings under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy
Act. In most cases, drainage districts excepted, those settlements involved no reduction in the principal of existing debts. Concessions
were commonly made by reducing or cancelling all or part of the accumulated past-due interest and by the acceptance of new refunding
bonds carrying reduced rates of interest in exchange for the old
ones. Much of that "boom-time" debt in the form of refunding bonds
is still unpaid; payments maturing on these still serve to increase current local taxes.
There can be little doubt that the record made by the Supreme
Court in the enforcement of municipal bonds was a potent influence
in bringing about settlements of defaulted bonds and in restoring
the credit of Florida governmental bodies in the market. For a
number of years now, Florida securities have found a substantial
market at surprisingly good prices, if we consider their prior record
of defaults. Full credit, therefore, should be accorded the Court for
the part its decisions have played in helping to rebuild the economy
of the state, which today has reached a new high.
We have referred to the fact that some bonds were held void because they were issued in violation of a provision of the State Constitution. 0 The Supreme Court holds that, since the Legislature does
not - because it cannot - have power to authorize bonds contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution, it has no power to validate bonds
that violate that instrument; likewise, it has no power to endow a
state court with power or jurisdiction to do, by its decree, that which
the Legislature itself can not do." First consideration, therefore,
IoSee pp. 288, 289 supra.
"'See Weinberger v. Board of Pub. Instr., 93 Fla. 470, 479, 112 So. 253, 256
(1927) (suit to enjoin issue of bonds previously validated): "The legislature itself,
even by express enactment, could not lawfully authorize the issuance of bonds
contrary to the express and mandatory limitations of the Constitution, nor could
the Legislature by subsequent Act, nor the Courts by decree, validate bonds which
are void ab initio because issued in violation of controlling mandatory organic
limitations. If the Legislature, by validating Act, or the Courts by procedure and
decree authorized only by legislative enactment, can vitalize bonds issued in
violation of constitutional mandate, then such legislative or judicial action would

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 2
LEGAL ASPECTS OF BOND FINANCING
must be given to the provisions of the state Constitution as they were
and as they now are, to determine how and to what extent they limit
or regulate the power of the Legislature to authorize the issuance of
bonds, and how those provisions have been construed and applied by
the Supreme Court. It is virtually impossible to understand them fully
without some knowledge of the economic conditions that prevailed
in Florida prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1885. That
instrument was the product of human experience; it was not drafted
in a vacuum but to meet the needs of its people.
FLORIDA'S EARLY ECONoMIc DIFFIcULTIEs

From the time of its settlement by the Spaniards until it became
a state - a period of approximately 300 years - Florida's growth was
slow. Its economy was primitive and based solely on the agricultural
development of a relatively small portion of the state. Timber and
timber products did not become an asset of prime importance to the
state's economy until railroads were constructed and a means provided for the transport of products of the forests to markets at a distance. Prior to the Civil War the state had realized its need for railroads and had sought to encourage their construction by authorizing
counties to issue bonds to purchase their stocks.1 2 It enacted laws to
promote the construction of "Internal Improvements," meaning essentially railroads and canals, by offering subsidies in the form of
grants of land measured by the mileage constructed. This policy met
with only limited success, for in November 1859 only 230 miles had
been railed. When the Civil War began none of those railroads had
complied fully with the conditions of its respective charter. As in
other Southern states, the war brought destruction of properties of
all kinds, including railroads; currency depreciated in value and,
with the blockade of ports by the Federals, commerce almost expired.
The slaves, upon whom the agriculture of the state depended, were
freed, and a radical readjustment of relations between the white and
Negro races, including the conversion of former slaves into free laborers, became necessary.
Within two years after the war was over the federal policy of
reconstruction was initiated. Under it control of the state government
overreach the Constitution, and the organic provisions, contrary to which such
bonds were issued, would be futile."
12See, e.g., Columbia County v. King, 13 Fla. 451 (1870); Cotten v. Leon County,

6 Fla. 610 (1856).
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was at first vested in federal military authorities. Later, with the aid
of federal authority, the state government was taken over by newcomers - outsiders who utilized the votes of ex-slaves to acquire and
maintain their control of its affairs. Those who thus acquired political
power used it throughout that period to exploit the income, resources,
and credit of the state for private gain. As a result the state debt in
1874 amounted to seven million dollars. Millions of acres of public
lands had been granted to railroads and canal companies under the
Improvement Act. The state had guaranteed payment of interest on
bonds issued by railroads, all of which were in default. The Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Fund took over the railroads and resold
them, but at a loss in every instance. As a result the state's liability
on its guarantee of interest remained unaffected, except that the
amount of it continued to increase with each passing month. This
liability was finally settled in 1881 by use of proceeds from a sale of
four million acres of public lands to Hamilton Disston at 25c an acre.
After local white citizens regained control of their government in
1876 conditions began to improve, and efforts were made to reestablish
government on a sound, economical basis. At that time the total
population of the state was still less than 350,000, spread over an area
of 35 million acres. More than half the total population lived in
eleven counties, all of which, with the exception of Monroe and
Orange, were located in the northern tier extending from Escambia on
the west to the Atlantic Ocean; and in ten of the eleven agriculture
was the principal and practically the only profitable industry. Only
three cities were included in the 1880 census; their populations were:
Key West, 8,890; Jacksonville, 7,650; and Pensacola, 6,845. The population of the peninsular section of the state was small, and no development of consequence had taken place there.
STATE BONDS

It was under these conditions that the Convention of 1885 undertook to revise the Constitution of 1868, our fourth. The new Constitution of 1885, still in effect though amended approximately one hundred times, reflects as a whole in its original form the economic condition of the state then existing, particularly in its provisions for
paying the costs of government. 13 Financing of the state, the counties,
"3The general unhappiness with the comparatively liberal restrictions on the
issue of state bonds is patent in the statement by Mr. Justice Wescott in Advisory
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and the cities was dealt with in sections of Articles IV and IX. Financing of a system of public free schools was provided by sections of Article
XII. The limitations placed upon the power of the state to borrow
money, and the absence of limitations upon the power of local subdivisions and authorities to do so, show that the Convention did not
anticipate that the state would need large sums of money for public
improvements; it apparently assumed that these would be provided
by counties, cities, and other subdivisions under the authority and to
the extent the Legislature might authorize. Thus the Constitution
was designed to fit the then economic condition of the state. The
total cost of all government was divided, as the Supreme Court later
said, by limiting the levy of state taxes to state purposes, county taxes
to county purposes, and city taxes to city purposes. 14 As we shall see,
numerous amendments to the Constitution, made necessary by radical
changes in the state's economy, have completely altered that scheme.
The Constitutions of 1868 and 1885
Article XII of the Constitution of 1868 contained four sections
relating to governmental finance. Section 2 required the Legislature
to raise "revenue sufficient to defray the expenses of the state for each
fiscal year," and "a sufficient sum to pay the principal and interest
of the indebtedness of the state." Under Section 6 the Legislature
was authorized to grant to counties and incorporated towns power
to levy taxes for county and corporation purposes - and no others.
Section 7 gave the Legislature power to provide for issuing "state
bonds . . . for securing the debt of the state and for the erection of
state buildings, support of state institutions and perfecting public
works." Section 8 prohibited the levy of a tax for the benefit of any
Opinion to Governor, 13 Fla. 699, 715 (1871): "1 believe the power to pledge the
faith and credit of a State or Nation should not exist except for purposes of
national defense in time of war. It is poor government that cannot sustain itself
by legitimate taxation, and in light of past history we can truly say that it is
best that the powers of the Government should be thus limited, or if public
enterprises are to be aided, that such aid should be in the form of a cash appropriation, thus preventing burdensojue and oftentimes repudiated indebtedness."
14FLA. CoNsr. Art. IX, §§5, 6, Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 37, 126 So. 308, 322
(1930): "It is clear . . . that our Constitution contemplates that an exclusively

State purpose must be accomplished by State Taxation; an exclusively county
purpose, in which the state has no sovereign interest, by county taxation." For
a similar view see Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318, 43 Am. Rep. 323 (1881),
confining municipal taxes and expenditures to city purposes.
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chartered company of the state or for payment of interest on bonds
issued by such companies, or by counties or corporations for the
benefit of a chartered company.15
Section 7 of Article XII of the 1868 Constitution, quoted in the
preceding paragraph, was an express declaration of power in the Legislature to provide for issuing state bonds bearing interest for securing
the debt of the state for the erection of state buildings, support of
state institutions, and perfecting public works. That section was rewritten for the new Constitution and includes the same declaration
of power but limits the purposes for which state bonds could be issued
to repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and refunding existing
indebtedness. Thus the 1885 Convention deliberately omitted the
former broad purposes for which bonds could be issued.
Judicial Interpretationof ConstitutionalLimitations
The Supreme Court, in construing the 1868 provision, had held
that the powers of a subsequent Legislature cannot be limited by an
exercise of the powers of a prior one, unless the act of the prior Legislature was ".... of such character as called into operation a constitutional limitation, and something more than a single antecedent exercise of legislative power stood in the way of the exercise of the powers
of the subsequent one." 16 It had also held that this provision, by
expressly declaring that the Legislature should have power to authorize the issue of bonds for the purposes expressly enumerated, thereby
limited the legislative power to authorize the issue of state bonds to
17
those purposes and no others. '
'5Art. XII, §2, of the 1868 Constitution was carried forward in the 1885 Constitution as Art. IX, §2. Art. XII, §6 (with the exception of the last two sentences,
which are not material here) became Art. IX, §5; and Art. XII, §8, became Art.
IX, §7. Art. IX, §10, is a new section, designed to leave no doubt as to the meaning
and effect of §§5, 7 of that article.
16Gonales v. Sullivan, 16 Fla. 791, 819 (1878); the Court further said: ".
the power of one Legislature is no greater than another [sic]. Where the power
of the subsequent one is limited, it results from the fact that the act of the first
is of such character that the organic law renders it inviolable through constitutional
limitations covering the subject." Ibid. If the prior act of the legislature is a
mere legislative declaration not intended to amount to a contract, however, its
abrogation is not an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights.
17Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587, 615 (1874) (specific enumeration of objects for
which bonds can be issued is implied limitation as well as express authorization):
"We have said that the power of the Legislature to issue bonds was circumscribed
and limited to the issuing of bonds for securing existing public indebtedness, the
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In answer to a request of the Governor the Supreme Court advised in 1927:18

"The Road Department is a state agency and a component
part of the State government.... A debt therefore incurred by
the Road Department pursuant to lawful authority is a State
obligation .... The Constitution does not contemplate that

State Revenues may be anticipated or supplemented by money
borrowed upon promises to pay in the future .... [Any at-

tempt to authorize an agency of the State to borrow money or
issue any promise to pay which would be an obligation of the
State for anticipated public work, is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution ......
The Court regarded these conclusions as the necessary consequence
of the provisions of Sections 2 and 6 of Article IX, which were to be
construed in pari materia. The purpose of Section 2 was to limit
current state taxes to current state expenses and to require the state
to provide sufficient revenue for the payment of those expenses so
that no operating deficit would be created. Section 6 prohibited the
state from borrowing money to supplement its current revenue.
The Court did not refer to the manner in which old Section 7 of
Article XII had been modified when brought forward into the new
Constitution as Section 6 of Article IX. Under standard rules of
constitutional construction, however, omission from the new provision of a grant of power to issue bonds to erect state buildings,
support state institutions, and perfect public works should conclusively demonstrate that the Convention intended to prohibit the
issue of state bonds for any purpose not expressly designated in the
new provision. These permitted purposes were to suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, or to refund the then-existing debt - now
long since paid in full.
In later opinions the Court has followed the reasoning and conclusions of that Advisory Opinion. For example it held void, as contraerection of State buildings, the support of State institutions and perfecting public
works. The Constitution has specified these as the objects for which bonds may be
authorized. The purpose and intent of the Constitution must have been to limit
the exercise of the legislative power upon this subject, for we must impute to it
some purpose and some object to be accomplished by it."
IsAdvisory Opinion to Governor, 94 Fla. 967, 982, 983, 985, 114 So. 850, 855, 856
(1927).
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vening this new section, a statute authorizing the Road Department
to contract for the purchase of Connor's Highway, paying one fifth in
cash and the balance in four installments.' 9 It also held void a statutory provision authorizing the Everglades Drainage District to issue
bonds, which it construed as impliedly obligating the state to appropriate any funds necessary to buy in lands sold for delinquent
drainage taxes. This would have constituted a direct guarantee of the
payment of the drainage taxes and an indirect guarantee of payment
of the bonds. In view of the limitations of Section 6, "the State can
not legally in any form or manner, either directly or indirectly or
contingently pay or be obligated to pay the whole or any part of the
20
principal or interest of the bonds . . ." of that drainage district.
Attention is especially directed to the holding that the state could not
"pay" the debt, much less be obligated to pay.
A later opinion, Amos v. Mathews,21 quotes from these earlier
ones and reaffirms the principles there established, with a full discussion of this section of the Constitution and of the prior cases bearing upon it. The Court held that the gasoline taxes levied by the
act would have been void if they had been held state taxes, because
they were appropriated to aid counties in paying county debts - and
the state has no power to do this. The most recent decision dealing
with this question held void a purported authorization to the State
Road Department to use "other funds of the Road Department" to
pay "rentals" to the Improvement Commission, which it would in
22
turn use to pay bonds issued by it under that act.
The Supreme Court of Florida has never, either expressly or by
necessary implication, reversed these decisions or any of the principles
there announced. Neither the state nor any agency of it can incur
debts or obligate future Legislatures directly, indirectly, or contingently to pay such debts or to provide for their payment. No debts
19State ex rel. Davis v. Green, 95 Fla. 117, 129, 116 So. 66, 70 (1928): "The
peculiar terms of the Act and the proceedings sought to be authorized by it would
in effect create a binding continuing interest bearing contract obligation of the
State to pay money in the future that would violate the intent of Section 6, Article
IX of the Constitution."
2OMartin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 572, 116 So. 449, 463 (1928).
2199 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930).
22Now, as amended, FLA. STAT. §§420.12-420.17 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws
1947, c. 23758, State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 160 Fla. 230, 243, 34 So.2d
443, 450 (1948): "As to funds other than the eighty per cent gas tax surpluses, we
are of the view that the legislature was without power to authorize the State Road
Department to obligate them for this purpose."
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to repel invasion or suppress insurrection have been incurred. All
former indebtedness of the state has been paid, with the result that the
provision authorizing refunding has in effect been eliminated from the
Constitution. For many years the Court and the people of Florida
have accepted as an established public policy the incapacity of the
state to incur any debt unless one of the two stated emergencies arises.
This view necessarily presupposes that (a) each Legislature will
provide funds to pay all appropriations made by it, and (b) all expenditures by executive and administrative officers will be within
the sums appropriated.
Exceptions by Constitutional Amendment
It is true that two major types of exceptions to that general policy
have been created by amendments, although neither expressly states
that it was so intended.
Road Bonds - Article XII, Section 16. The first exception, adopted
in 1942, is self-executing.23 It levies a tax of two cents per gallon on
all gasoline sold in the state until January 1, 1993, and appropriates
the proceeds of that tax. First, these proceeds must be used to pay
road bonds issued by counties and road districts prior to July 1, 1931,
or any bonds issued to refund them. Second, eighty percent of any
surplus remaining to the credit of any county is appropriated to the
Road Department for use in constructing state roads and bridges
within the county; the other twenty percent goes directly to the county
commissioners for their use in constructing roads and bridges. The
total fund is allocated and distributed to the credit of the various
counties according to a formula; and the Legislature is prohibited
from making any changes in the provisions of the amendment. A
State Board of Administration has been created to administer the
fund; and it is authorized to issue refunding bonds and pledge the
gas tax proceeds to the payment thereof. Since payment of the old
bonds, and of any refunding bonds, is the primary duty of that board
and is mandatory in that any refunding bonds issued by it are paid
from state taxes appropriated to the payment thereof, both the old
bonds and the refunding bonds have become obligations of the state
to the extent of the taxes appropriated to their payment.
Originally it was estimated that the appropriated gasoline taxes
23FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §16.
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would liquidate the entire debt before 1993. The increase in receipts
and the savings effected in the reduction of interest by refunding now
appear sufficient to pay off all these bonds long before the amendment
expires. During the first few years after the plan was instituted some
counties were required to make small levies to supplement their share
of the gas tax receipts in order to pay currently maturing interest.
Since then, however, all payments due have been made from the state
fund only, which has been more than adequate therefor. The amendment accordingly did create an exception to the general prohibition
against the issue of bonds by the state; it authorized what could not
have been authorized by statute, namely, the use of state tax funds to
pay county and road district bonds, the assumption of such bonds by
the state, and the issue of state bonds to refund them.
In 1947 the Legislature authorized the Improvement Commission
to issue what are mistakenly called "revenue bonds." 24 The so-called
revenue pledged as security for payment of them, however, consists
solely of eighty percent of the surplus of the state gas taxes accruing
with the Road Department to the credit of a county under Section 16
of Article IX, which the Road Department by contract with the State
Improvement Commission agrees to use to pay the bonds issued under
the authority of that act. The Court upheld this provision because
it supplements the amendment and provides a means by which future
annual receipts of the Road Department, in esse under that amendment, may be funded or anticipated; the department is thereby enabled to construct roads and bridges now, without waiting until
sufficient cash accumulates from annual receipts. Bonds issued under
that act, though erroneously called "revenue bonds," are, as the Court
has held, obligations of the Road Department to the extent of the
surplus gas taxes constitutionally made available to it for payment
thereof, and therefore are state bonds though not general obligations.
Such an act would have been void prior to the 1942 amendment.25
School Bonds -Article XII, Section 18. The other major type of
exception culminated in 1952 with the adoption of Article XII, Section
18, under which bonds will undoubtedly be issued in the near future.
This amendment follows the pattern set ten years earlier for roads.
24See note 22 supra.
25Though Art. IX, §16, does not expressly allow the issue of bonds, the validity
of Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23758, was confirmed in State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n,
160 Fla. 230, 34 So.2d 443 (1948).
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It appropriates a portion of the proceeds from state motor vehicle
licenses to the State Board of Education for a period of thirty years,
authorizes that board to issue bonds in its own name, on behalf of
the counties, and pledges the fund to the payment thereof. This plan
enables a state agency to borrow money on state obligations against
future state tax collections, the proceeds from the bonds to be used
by county boards of public instruction in the construction of schoolhouses and other capital school improvements in the various counties
- all of which expenditures were formerly county only. In fact, the
Court had previously held that the provisions of Article XII for the
financing of schools were exclusive, and had voided two issues of city
bonds, the proceeds of which were used to build high schools. 26
Florida's assumption of responsibilities under these amendments
altered the original plan of the Constitution that they should be
financed by local subdivisions. The changes made were the direct
consequence of the tremendous increase in population of the state
and of the changes in its economy since the present Constitution was
adopted. Even prior to the adoption of Article IX, Section 16, the
state had created the State Road Department and had made biennial
appropriations to it for use in constructing roads and bridges. The
amendment merely embedded that policy in the Constitution. It
was designed primarily to relieve local conditions created by the
large debts that counties and road districts had incurred and were
unable to pay. Those debts had arisen from attempts by local subdivisions to construct what had become state highways for the use
of the rapidly increasing number of automobiles, trucks, and buses so
essential to the transportation of persons and property both intrastate
and interstate.
School Bonds- Article XII, Sections 17, 9. The 1952 amendment
is the third constitutional shift from the original plan of Article XII.
Years ago our counties had found that the provisions of Sections 4,
8, 9, and 10 of that article did not provide them with sufficient funds
to construct the needed schoolhouses and that there was no other
source from which funds could be obtained. Section 17 was accordingly added to Article XII in 1912. It authorized the Legislature to provide for the creation of special tax school districts, possessing authority
to issue bonds payable from an unlimited ad valorem tax on all prop26Munroe v. Reeves, 71 Fla. 612, 71 So. 922 (1916); Brown v. Lakeland, 61
Fla. 508, 54 So. 716 (1911).
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erty within each district. Yet by 1926 the cost of providing an adequate
curriculum and proper maintenance of schools had become so great
that many of the smaller and less wealthy counties were unable to
maintain the standards demanded by the public. Section 9 of Article
XII was then amended to authorize the Legislature to appropriate,
according to some principle of classification, funds of the state to
support and maintain county schools. The 1952 amendment was
evoked by the tremendous increase in the number of pupils in our
schools since World War II, by the modem requirements for adequate
school buildings, which include facilities not regarded as essential
in the years gone by, and by decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States prescribing facilities in schools for Negroes equal to
those furnished white pupils.
ConstitutionalAmendments Limiting Sources of State Revenue
Notwithstanding the state's assumption of responsibility for providing funds for these purposes, originally considered local, it has
voluntarily since 1924 actually limited by constitutional amendments
its ability to provide for its own current expenses. In that year Section
11 was added to Article IX, prohibiting levy of taxes upon the income
of residents of Florida, and also upon inheritances, subject since 1929
to a proviso that the Legislature may levy estate and inheritance taxes
not exceeding the amounts that by federal law can be credited against
or deducted from any corresponding federal taxes.
In 1930 Section 13 was added to Article IX. It provided that the
license tax on motor vehicles should be in lieu of all ad valorem taxes
assessable against them. Four years later Section 7 was added to
Article X. It granted to the owners of homesteads exemption from all
taxation, except assessments for special benefits, up to the assessed
valuation of $5,000.
In 1940 three more amendments were adopted. Section 2 of Article
IX was amended by repealing Section 6 of Article XII, which provided a one-mill ad valorem tax for school purposes, and by prohibiting the state from levying any ad valorem taxes on real or personal property other than intangibles. To Article IX was added
Section 15, authorizing the Legislature to distribute to the several
counties in equal amounts the proceeds of excise taxes on the operation of pari-mutuel pools, while Section 9 of Article IX exempted
from all taxation property to the value of $500 of widows and resi-
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dents disabled by war or other misfortune. A 1944 amendment set
27
a two-mill maximum rate on taxes on intangible property.
These limitations on the taxing power of the state have neither
crippled nor hampered its current operations, although the program
includes extensive construction of state buildings and an ever-expanding welfare program, as well as assumption by the state of obligations
of and to counties, schools, and their creditors. Florida's cash balance
on July 1, 1953, was the largest in its history.
Exception by Judicial Interpretation- Revenue Bonds
We have called attention to the exceptions to Section 6 of Article
IX created by amendments to Articles IX and XII. Still another has
been recognized by decisions of the Supreme Court. It is the indirect
consequence of the 1930 amendment to Section 6, which conditions
the power of counties and cities to issue bonds by requiring the approval thereof by "a majority of the votes cast in an election in which
a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors . . . shall
participate." In State v. Miami,28 in 1933, the Court refused to define
what bonds were within the intendment of that amendment. But it
construed the amendment liberally in the light of the long-established
custom of Florida municipalities to operate public utilities in a proprietary capacity. 29
That decision was followed by a host of others approving revenue
certificates or bonds payable solely out of the net income of existing
utilities. 30 In course of time the Court approved issues in instances
in which there were no existing utilities and the purposes of the
issues were to construct new plants.31 This transition seems to have
been made without comment or attempt to justify it. 32 The Court
took it for granted that the difference in facts did not call for the application of a different principle. But it did not reverse or expressly
2FLA. CONsT. Art. IX, §1.
28113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933).
20For full discussion see notes 94-104 infra and text thereat.
3
OApproximately 50 such decisions are listed in Note, 146 A.L.R. 329 (1943).
3'See, e.g., State v. Winter Park, 160 Fla. 380, 34 So.2d 740 (1948); State v.
Daytona Beach, 160 Fla. 204, 34 So.2d 309 (1948); State v. Miami, 157 Fla. 726,
27 So.2d 118 (1946); State v. Key West, 153 Fla. 226, 14 So.2d 707 (1943); Trudnak
v. Gustafson, 133 Fla. 834, 183 So. 494 (1938).
32See, e.g., Zinnen v. Fort Lauderdale, 159 Fla. 498, 500, 32 So.2d 162, 163 (1947),
in which the Court, after citing cases on this point, commented: "If they [bonds]
are to be paid for exclusively from income from the facility, it is not material
whether they are new or were additions to facilities already owned and operated."
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modify the reasons given in its Miami opinion for making the first
exception to the general rule.
In 1936 Hopkins v. Baldwin33 was presented to the Court. The
State Board of Control proposed to issue revenue certificates payable
solely from the fees, rents, and other charges to be realized from the
renting of the facilities to be constructed -dormitories at the University - to students, professors, and others. No tax money was pledged
to the payment of the proposed obligations. The Court validated
them because, as it said, they were not payable from "appropriations
of money made by the State or raised pursuant to law under its
authority" but solely from rental charges. That revenue, said the
Court, will be "derived from the specified outside sources as charges
for the use of the new facilities" and will therefore constitute a
"proprietary fund in esse from the very moment the new buildings
are constructed and put into use"; that fund will "pass through the
State's hands" but will not "become State funds so long as the
money borrowed for the purposes of the project remains unrepaid." 34
As in the Miami case, the Court held that future revenue from
"outside sources" could be "funded" by borrowing against it and
pledging it to the repayment of the obligations incurred - even though
no such utilities or facilities had been in operation when Section 6
was amended.
The Court did not refer to the fact that under the Constitution
of 1868 the Legislature could authorize the issue of state bonds
to build state buildings and to the fact that the Constitutional Convention of 1885 had deliberately eliminated that power. It assumed
that the "bonds" in question were not "state bonds" for the reasons
given above and therefore did not come within the prohibition of
Section 6, either in its original form or in its present amended form,
against the issue of "state bonds."3 5
The two Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board cases involved a plan
of the Tuberculosis Hospital Board to build a state hospital and
finance the cost of construction by an issue of revenue certificates payable solely from fees and charges made to patients utilizing its facilities.
The Court on the first appeal disapproved the plan because it embraced a mortgage on the property and a pledge of a state legislative
3123 Fla. 649, 167 So. 677 (1936).
at 667, 668, 669, 167 So. at 684, 685, respectively.
3sCompare this reasoning with that in State v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So.
341d.

6 (1933).
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appropriation of $200,000 as security for the new debt. 36 On the
second appeal the bonds were validated after those two objectionable
features had been eliminated.37 As in the Hopkins case, the Court
held that the record justified the assumption that the plan was offered
in good faith and was not a subterfuge to evade the provisions of the
Constitution. But it added an express warning that, if any attempt
should later be made to appropriate state taxes or resources to the
payment of the bonds, appropriate relief would be granted to restrain
such action.
In each case the decision was only that obligations of a state agency
payable solely from "revenue" received by it from "outside sources"
for the use of a utility or project, and not from state taxes directly
or indirectly, are not state bonds within the meaning of Section 6.
In the second Brash opinion the Court, following similar holdings
in earlier decisions relating to city revenue bonds, held that any reasonable doubt as to authority to issue bonds "would be resolved against
the validity of the instruments proposed" and that the burden of
"demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt" that the scheme of the
issuing state agency would not result in a violation of Section 6 rested
upon the state authorities. 3s
In cases later arising under Chapter 22821 of Florida Laws 194539
the Court approved, first, the power of the State Improvement Commission and, second, the issue of bonds by the Commission under the
act. But bonds issued under that act are payable solely from "outside"
revenues; they are "revenue bonds," not "state bonds," for the reasons
40
given in the Hopkins case.
In approving bonds issued by the Improvement Commission under
Chapter 23758 of Florida. Laws 194711 the Court quite properly did
not hold that they were "revenue bonds." It did not, however, classify
30Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla. 167, 167 So. 827 (1936).
37Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla. 652, 169 So. 218 (1936).
381d. at 656, 169 So. at 219.
3DNow, as amended, FLA. STAT. §§420.02, 420.06, 420.08, 420.09 (1951), State
v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 159 Fla. 358, 31 So.2d 548 (1947) (bonds issued
to finance toll roads and bridges); State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 158 Fla.
743, 30 So.2d 97 (1947) (bonds issued to finance industrial commission building
and pledging rentals from the use of the building); State ex rel. Watson v.
Caldwell, 156 Fla. 618, 23 So.2d 855 (1945), supplemented, 157 Fla. 70, 24 So.2d
797 (1946).
4-Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649, 167 So. 677 (1936).
41See note 22 supra.
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them as general obligations of the state but rather as obligations of a
state agency, the Road Department, payable out of a particular source.
The older Advisory Opinion had said that such obligations would be
"state bonds" because payable directly and solely from the proceeds of
a state tax. The 1942 constitutional amendment, effective for a period
of fifty years, expressly authorized the tax and issuance of refunding
bonds secured by its proceeds and prohibited the Legislature from reducing the tax or making any change in the appropriation of the proceeds. The statute merely provided for funding anticipated future
receipts of the State Road Department from that tax; these funds
are in esse to the extent of the surplus that remains each year in
the hands of the State Board of Administration after the payment of
the old country road bonds and interest accruing thereon; payment
under that statute to the extent of eighty percent of such surplus is
assured by an express contract of the Road Department to use the
surplus tax funds for that purpose.
Nevertheless, although the bonds issued under that act are in a
sense state bonds, for the reasons given, they are not general obligations of the state.42 Similarly, bonds issued by the Improvement
Commission under Chapter 22821, as well as revenue bonds issued
by the Board of Control, Tuberculosis Board, and other state agencies,
are not state bonds. If they were they could not be issued at all, because they would violate the provisions of Article IX, Section 6, and
do not come under any constitutional exception thereto.
In fact, the State of Florida could not issue a general obligation
bond today, even if Section 6 did not prohibit it, for in 1940 Article
IX, Section 2, was amended by striking out, for every purpose, the
power of the state to levy ad valorem taxes. Since 1940 the only sources
of revenue available to the state itself are such special levies as excise
taxes, licenses, and franchises; and the Supreme Court has never reversed the holding in its Advisory Opinion 43 that Section 6 forbids a
state agency to incur obligations payable out of excise taxes.
Finally, no state bonds payable even from a special fund can be
issued for a purpose other than the two specified in Article IX, Section
6- to repel invasion or suppress insurrection - unless that section
be amended either directly or by necessary implication from amendment of another section. 44
42State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 160 Fla. 230, 34 So.2d 443 (1948).
4394 Fla. 967, 114 So. 850 (1927).
441t has been so amended by FLA. CoNsr. Art. IX, §16, and Art. XII, §18.
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CouNTY BONDS

Pre-1930 Road Bonds
Before the Constitution of 1885 was adopted the Legislature authorized counties to build courthouses and jails, provided the issue
was first approved at an election by the "legal voters of the county." 45
That act was amended in 1899 to include authority to issue bonds
for the building of hard-surfaced highways, and again in 1931 to require prior approval of issues at elections of freeholders, as required
by the amendment, then just adopted, to Article IX, Section 6. Back
in 1911 the Legislature had authorized the incorporation of special
road and bridge districts with power to issue bonds to construct hardsurfaced roads, subject to the approval of freeholders at an election.4 6
All bonds issued under those statutes were secured by a pledge to
levy sufficient ad valorem taxes, on all taxable property within the
boundary of the issuing authority, to pay them. Numerous special
road and bridge districts were organized under the general law; many
others were created by special acts of the Legislature. Both districts
and counties took full advantage of the power given them to issue
bonds to build hard-surfaced roads. The county roads improved were
usually portions of main roads or highways, the idea being that they
would sooner or later be connected with like roads in adjacent counties
to form through highways. Most of the districts were organized to
build roads in undeveloped areas. The total amount of bonds issued
for road construction purposes reached an all-time high just before
the real estate boom collapsed. When that occurred land values
shrank, taxes went unpaid, and principal and interest payments on
bonds went into default. The situation was critical and acute. Temporary and partial relief was afforded by statutes enacted in 1929
and 1931, but conditions were not restored to normalcy until after
the adoption of Section 16, Article IX, in 1942.47
45Fla. Laws 1877, c. 2088, now FLA. STAT. c. 130 (1951).
46Fla. Laws 1911, c. 6208, now FLA. STAT. C. 140 (1951).
47See note 23 supra and text thereat. Those old county and district road bonds
are now being paid off by the State Board of Administration, a constitutional body.
Many counties are entirely free from their old road debt; many more would be
free but for the fact that their bonds have not yet matured and are not callable.
The amount of the annual receipts from the 2c constitutional tax appropriated
to the payment of those bonds, even after deducting the amount required to pay
bonds and coupons maturing each year, exceeds the total amount collected during
the first year following the adoption of Art. IX, §16. No more refunding bonds
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Courthouses and Jails-From

Leon County to Tapers

In 1883 the Legislature authorized the county commissions to
erect or repair a courthouse or jail or an addition thereto; to levy a
"building tax" not exceeding two mills per annum for not more than
five consecutive years "in lieu of all other building tax"; and to
enter into a written contract for the construction of the building or
addition, payment therefor to be made out of the proceeds of the
annual levies.48
This statute was amended in 1907 by increasing the permissible
maximum to not more than five mills per year and again in 1949 to
extend the period of the levy to fifteen consecutive years. 49
The act did not expressly authorize the issue of warrants or certificates; but in Borland v. Towles,50 decided in 1915, the Court held
that the Commission had authority to issue warrants representing
payments due on the contract and that the statute did not require
the proceeds of the successive levies to be collected before exercise
of the power to let the contract.
Since this statute did not expressly provide for the issue of warrants or other evidence of indebtedness, it was not redrafted after
Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution was amended, in 1930,
to require an election of freeholders. The absence of such revision
is not important, however, because the Court has held that the amendment became in any event a condition precedent to the issuance of
any "bonds" of a county or city.51
will be offered for public sale by the State Board of Administration. The surplus
gas tax is now being divided: 80% to the Road Department to build state roads
and bridges in the counties, and 20% to the county commissioners for roads and
bridges therein. Whenever the old debt of a county is paid its entire share of
the annual collections until 1933 constitutes surplus and is now and will continue to
be available for the construction or reconstruction of roads within the county.
48Fla. Laws 1883, c. 3421, now FLA. STAT. C.135 (1951).
49There must have been some particular reason for the passage of the original
of this act, just six years after the passage of the 1877 general act authorizing a
county to issue general obligation bonds to build courthouses and jails. It was
probably intended to provide a simpler method of financing projects too small
to justify the expense of issuing bonds; construction would instead be financed
locally through a contractor.
501t said, 69 Fla. 125, 126, 67 So. 640, 641 (1915): "The Statute does not require that the funds derived from successive tax levies shall be collected in whole
or in part before the power to contract for the erection of a court house can be
exercised .... "
5'E.g., State v. Miami, 157 Fla. 747, 26 So.2d 903 (1946); Spearman Brewing
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In 1938 Leon County, proceeding under Section 135.01, decided to
build a jail and to finance its construction by levying a tax not exceeding five mills per year for five years. Estimating that the levies would
produce not less than 585,000, it authorized the issue of tax anticipation certificates by number, denomination, and maturities, pledging
the proceeds of the tax to payment of the certificates. In a proceeding
brought to validate these certificates the Court pointed out that the
erection of a courthouse was "a necessary county expense" ratably
distributable over the period of five years, and that this power "had
not been abrogated" by the 1930 amendment of Section 6 requiring
an election of freeholders, because ". . . the power to contract for
governmental needs against contemplated currently budgeted revenues available to be expended for same is not the creation of an unauthorized bond debt without the approval of the freeholder electors
in violation of Amended Section 6 . .
-.52 Accordingly the county
was ".... duly authorized to enter into a contract for the erection of
such needed public improvement to be paid for in installments running over a period not exceeding five years out of the proceeds of
said special tax when, and as, collected to apply on the contract so
entered into . . . ."3 The Court proceeded to hold, however, that
".... the funding operation contemplated.., in the proposed issuance
or [sic] tax Anticipation Certificates of Indebtedness is nothing more
than a proposal to issue on the county's credit a form of security that
is in contemplation of law a limited revenue county 'bond' not duly
authorized . . . ."4 Mr. Justice Davis wrote this opinion.
About four months later the county commissioners of Leon nevertheless entered into a contract for the construction of a jail, agreeing
to pay the contractor himself with "certificates of payment" to be issued
"every two weeks as the work progresses." Those certificates were to
be paid from the jail building fund as collected. The circuit court
dismissed a bill to enjoin letting the contract, and the Supreme Court
affirmed in Tapers v. Pichard,5 in an opinion by Mr. Justice Terrell
Co. v. Pensacola, 136 Fla. 869, 187 So. 365 (1939) (FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §6, held
applicable to issuance of city bonds payable solely from paving assessment, despite
absence of provision in 1923 act requiring approval by freeholders); Jacksonville
v. Renfroe, 102 Fla. 512, 136 So. 254 (1931).
52Leon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 513, 165 So. 666, 669 (1936).
53Id. at 514, 165 So. at 669.
54Id. at 515, 165 So. at 669.
55124 Fla. 549, 165 So. 39 (1936).
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concurred in by all the justices, including Mr. Justice Davis. This
opinion interpreted the prior Leon County case as holding that Section
6 had no application to contracts for governmental needs when executed in the due course of authorized budgetary requirements; that
the construction of jails was a necessary budgetary requirement of
the county; that the means of imposing and collecting the tax and
expending its proceeds provided all the safeguards contemplated by
Section 6; and that accordingly the county did not have to wait until
taxes had been collected before beginning construction.
It is difficult to reconcile these two opinions, yet both were unanimous and Mr. Justice Davis, the author of the Leon County
opinion, concurred "in the opinion and judgment" in the Tapers case.
If these two decisions be in conflict, we must assume that the second
reversed or modified the first; the latter has been consistently followed
in every case involving the construction of Section 185.01.
Admittedly some confusion is found in cases arising under other
statutes involving issues of so-called revenue bonds and attempting to
invoke the doctrine of the Tapers case to justify contracts to pay
these out of ad valorem taxes without holding an election by freeholders.56 A discussion of these decisions would serve no useful purpose, however, because the latest have apparently settled this question
for the future.5 7 There is no Supreme Court decision contrary to
the Tapers doctrine as regards the validity of contracts, taxes, and
issuance of securities under this statute; 58 and two recent cases dealing
with securities so issued, one involving a special act appropriating a
part of the race track money, follow the doctrine closely. 59 In both
the Court validated the issue and sale of certificates and the use of
the proceeds to pay for the work, thus eliminating the Leon County
opinion- ° as a precedent.
5

6E.g., Jacksonville v. Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 47 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1950)
(certificates to finance reconversion of fireboat by city secured by lien on boat);
Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Peters, 43 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1949) (bonds issued to finance
purchase of land for airport payable from revenue and ad valorem taxes).
5
7State v. Miami, 63 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1953); State v. Florida Imp'vt Comm'n,
60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1952).
58Sunshine Constr. Co. of Key West v. Board of Comm'rs, 54 So.2d 524 (Fla.
1951), ordering elimination, as either unnecessary or void, of a clause pledging the
full faith and credit of the county, nevertheless gives effect to Tapers by indicating
that a tax of not over 5 mills for not more than 5 years would be valid.
5
9State v. St. Johns County, 60 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1952); State v. Sumter County,
60 So2d 529 (Fla. 1952); cf. State v. Lafayette County, 55 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1952).
6
OLeon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666 (1930).
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Bar of Ad Valorem Tax Pledge without FreeholderVote
Shortly after those decisions the same question arose in a proceeding
by the Florida State Improvement Commission to validate its proposed issue of bonds to construct a county health center. 6' The county
had contracted to pay rentals for the project in an amount sufficient
to meet principal and interest on the debt. Rentals were payable
primarily from race track taxes; but the resolution also covenanted
that if the receipts from that source should prove insufficient the
county would meet the payments by levying an ad valorem property
tax of not over three mills. The Court, after reviewing the earlier
cases on "governmental necessity," held that a jail or courthouse stands
in a different class from any other county building in that the erection of each is "essential to the administration of the county government"; 2 that there is no similarity between the purposes served by a
courthouse or jail and those served by a hospital; that the question
is not merely one of "need" but rather of "actual necessity"; and
that judicial extension of the doctrine of governmental necessity to
include hospitals, parks, playgrounds, recreations centers, purchases
of rights-of-way, and construction of roads and bridges would amount
in effect to repeal of Article IX, Section 6. The opinion concluded
that amendment of this section, if needed, should be accomplished in
an orderly manner in accordance with express constitutional provisions.63
Bar of Police Power Revenue Pledge without Freeholder Vote
In its latest decision bearing upon this matter the Court disapproved a Miami bond issue to construct a city stockade, the bonds
to be paid out of the city fine and forfeiture fund.64 The opinion, by
Mr. Justice Terrell, states that no legislative authority was shown
for such an act and that there was "no other source of taxation from
which these bonds could be paid," and that, furthermore, even if the
Legislature had authorized the city fine and forfeiture fund to be
used for this purpose, an approving vote of the freeholders would
6iState v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1952). But see
State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 48 So .2d 165 (Fla. 1950).
62State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1952).
63FLA. CONST. Art. XVII.
64State v. Miami, 63 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1953).
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be necessary in order to avoid circumventing Section 6 of Article IX:
"The fact that there is a present necessity for a City Stockade does not
clothe this court with authority to approve the bonds under the facts
involved, absent an approving vote of the freeholders."6 5
The opinion is especially important because, after stating the purpose of Section 6, it points out that only two exceptions have been
recognized by previous decisions of the Court. These are instances in
which the securities are (1) "payable solely from revenues derived
from facilities provided by the proceeds of the bonds"; and (2) "issued
to finance essential governmental needs such as jails and court
houses." 68 The Court observed: "It is not contended that the cer67
tificates in question fall within either of the categories of certificates."
We must assume that the Court intended to include within the
first exception revenue bonds payable solely from revenues derived
from a facility already owned by the city, as well as one constructed
with the proceeds of the bonds. The conclusion was that certificates
not falling within one of the two exceptions noted cannot be issued
without the requisite prior approving vote of freeholders. Any confusion or misunderstanding as to this point that may have heretofore
existed should accordingly be eliminated.
As regards the second exception, the principle of the Tapers case,
which permits the building of a courthouse or jail under the provisions of Sections 135.01-135.02, is limited solely to obligations incurred
under that act - unless the Court's citation of its approval of the
issuance without an election of securities to finance construction of an
incinerator 68 indicates that this purpose also falls within the exceptions enumerated. That decision declines to overrule the prior decisions, even though at least one was in direct conflict with it.
CrT= BONDS

Under the Constitution of 1868 the Legislature was required to
establish a uniform system of county, township and municipal government by general law,69 but the Constitution of 1885 authorizes the
Legislature "to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to provide for
651d. at 334.
66Ibid.

67Ibid.
68jacksonville v. Nichols Eng. and Res. Corp., 49 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1950).
69FLA. CONsr. Art. IV, §21 (1868).
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their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to
alter or amend the same at any time."70 General laws are not required.
The legislative power may be exercised by special acts, and even the
existence of a general act does not preclude or prevent passage of
special acts relating to particular municipalities. In consequence
almost every city and town in Florida either has been incorporated
by special statute or has had its original charter amended and supplemented by special statutes. At every session of the Legislature numerous special statutes are enacted relating to various cities and towns.
For example, special acts passed since 1907 relating to the City of
Miami alone now number over 150.
Public versus Private Purpose- Article IX, Section 10
Under our Constitution the Legislature has power to determine
what is and what is not a municipal or public purpose, for which
the city may levy taxes and incur debts. This determination is not
conclusive and is subject to judicial review; but the judiciary will
usually approve it, absent reasons to the contrary. 71 For example, the
Court has held that a city has no authority to issue bonds to construct a golf course, this project being a corporate rather than a
governmental function,72 but when the Legislature has expressly
authorized a city to issue bonds to build a golf course the Court has
approved the legislative determination that this purpose is public. 73
A number of cases have arisen under Article IX, Section 10, of our
present Constitution, some of which involved county bonds. Prior to
the adoption of the 1868 Constitution the Legislature had in 1855
authorized counties to subscribe for stock in railroads, to issue county
70FLA. CONsr. Art. VIH, §8.

The comma needed after "municipalities" is

missing in the original.
71E.g., Peterson v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla. 71, 74, 105 So. 265, 266 (1925):
"Whether the object for which bonds are to be issued is a municipal purpose
may not be arbitrarily determined by legislation without regard to organic limitations; but a statutory determination of what is an appropriate municipal purpose will not be disturbed by the courts where the purpose designated by statute
is in fact municipal in its nature and no provision or organic law is violated in
such designation." Cf. State ex rel. Landis v. Dyer, 109 Fla. 33, 148 So. 201 (1933);
Venice v. State, 96 Fla. 527, 118 So. 308 (1928).
72Bradenton v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556 (1924).
73Coral Gables v. Hepkins, 107 Fla. 778, 144 So. 385 (1932); West v. Lake
Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 120 So. 361 (1929); Peterson v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla.
71, 105 So. 265 (1925).
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bonds in payment of the subscription, and to levy taxes to pay the
bonds.74 That act was held valid7 5 despite the claim that it violated
the 1839 Constitution, which prohibited the Legislature from "pledging the faith and credit of the state to raise funds in aid of any corporation whatsoever." 76 Later, in a mandamus action by holders of
bonds issued under that act to aid the construction of a railroad, the
Court adhered to its original opinion, because - and only because, as
it said - bonds had been issued by various counties and sold in reliance
upon its former decision. 77 Though a majority of the then justices
were of the opinion that the former decision was in error, they refused to overrule it.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court held unconstitutional an
issue of state bonds delivered to a railroad in exchange for an equal
amount of its bonds.78 The Legislature, it said, had no power to issue
bonds for any purpose except one of those expressly enumerated in
the Constitution, and the railroad to which the bonds were delivered
was not included within the program of "public works" to "perfect"
7
which the Constitution of 1868 authorized issuance of bonds. 9
Only one issue of bonds by a Florida city has been held void under
current Article IX, Section 10, after the sale of the bonds80 The federal
courts afterwards denied the bondholders any recovery for money had
and received."'
In its most recent decision the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a statute authorizing the condemnation of property for "redevelopment by private enterprise or by public agency in accordance with approved redevelopment plans" was not for a public purpose, because
the project contemplated the resale or lease of the property to other
private persons.8 2 An earlier decision had denied a county the right
to condemn unimproved property containing good hunting and fishing territory, the excuse for condemnation being merely that the
74Fla. Laws 1855, c. 610, §22, An Act to Encourage Internal Improvements.
75 Cotten v. Leon County, 6 Fla. 610 (1856).
76FLA. CONsr. Art. XII, §13 (1839). This Constitution, our first, is also known
by the dates 1838 and 1845; see Legis., 3 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 74, 75 (1950).
77Columbia County v. King, 13 Fla. 451 (1870).
7SHolland v. State, 15 Fla. 455 (1876): such issuance contravened FLA. CONsr.

Art. XII, §7 (1868).
79An 1875 amendment eliminated this latter clause.

soState

v. Belleair, 125 Fla. 669, 170 So. 434 (1926).
SuIn re Belleair v. Olds, 127 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1942).
S2Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
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county might in the future establish some parks and playgrounds
that would serve a public purpose.8 3
The case that has caused most comment, however, involved a proposed issue of bonds by the Town of North Miami.8 4 A number of
states, including Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, have
enacted legislation that permits cities to issue bonds to finance the
construction of industrial plants for lease to private parties. Proponents of this idea contend that the location of new industries in a
community is a public purpose, which the city legally can aid in
order to foster the growth of the community. This is substantially
the argument accepted in the Gotten case.85 The Court later criticized that decision; and Article IX, Section 10, of the current Constitution was obviously intended to prohibit this doctrine from being
again accepted. North Miami planned to issue revenue bonds, to
construct a plant with the proceeds, and to lease it to a private industry, which would agree to pay a fixed rental therefor sufficient to
pay off this city debt as it matured. Meantime the corporation would
have an option to purchase the plant by paying either the balance of
the debt plus a nominal sum or all sums due under the lease, thereby
acquiring the property in fee.
The Court held this transaction unconstitutional; neither public
money nor public credit could be "used for the purpose of acquiring
property for the benefit of a private concern." The financing of a
private enterprise by means of public funds is entirely foreign to a
proper concept of our constitutional system. Experience has shown
that ". . . such encroachments will lead inevitably to the utter destruction of the private enterprise system."8 6
Freeholder Vote on Debt Encumbering Property-Article
Section 6

IX,

Many legal problems have been created directly or indirectly by
the adoption in 1930 of the amendment to Article IX, Section 6.
Prior to that the Constitution contained no limitation on the power
of the Legislature to authorize cities and towns to incur indebtedness,
and it granted them that power with almost no restrictions. The res3Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483 (1947).
84State v. North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
BsCotten v. Leon County, 6 Fla. 610 (1856) (county bond issue to aid railroad

is for public purpose).
seState v. North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1952).
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sultant extravagance, which characterized municipal financing during the 1920's, and the collapse of public credit that followed were
the immediate and controlling reason for the adoption of this amendment. It differs from most of the prior statutes requiring approval
by the registered electors in that it limits the participants in a bond
election to freeholders. The Court has held that its purpose is to
give to freeholders whose realty would be encumbered in order to
meet the debt the right to prevent the creation of the debt.8 7 The
amendment is unique in one respect: the election is fruitless unless
a majority of the registered freeholders take part in it.s8
At first the statute permitted these bond elections to be held on
the same day with other elections, most of which were political; 9 and
as a result a majority of the registered freeholders usually participated.
Later statutes prohibited a bond election on the date of another
election, 90 thereby adding to the normal inertia of voters. Freeholders
found that in many instances the most effective way to defeat approval
of an issue was to remain away from the polls and thus prevent a
majority of their group from participating. To prevent this procedure the 1949 Legislature enacted another type of law. 9' Although a
county had installed at great expense, time, and trouble a modem and
efficient permanent system of registering electors for all elections and
for keeping the record up to date, this special act required all freeholders desiring to vote in a bond election to reregister shortly before
it in order to qualify. The existing permanent list of qualified freeholders was disregarded. No good reason was given for this unusual
and radical procedure. None was necessary; the reason was obvious.
As anticipated, the electors who reregistered under this special act
were but a small percentage of the number previously qualified under
87E.g., State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1952); State
v. Hillsborough County, 148 Fla. 163, 3 So.2d 882 (1941); Clover Leaf, Inc. v.
Jacksonville, 145 Fla. 341, 199 So. 923 (1940); Flint v. Duval County, 126 Fla. 18,
170 So. 587 (1936); Williams v. Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936); Sullivan v. Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211 (1931).
88E.g., State v. Miami Beach, 156 Fla. 546, 23 So.2d 720 (1945); Port of Palm
Beach Dist. v. State, 156 Fla. 99, 22 So.2d 581 (1945); Special Tax School Dist.
No. 3 v. State 153 Fla. 292, 14 So.2d 405 (1943); State v. Dade County, 144 Fla. 448,
198 So. 102 (1940); State ex rel. Linebaugh v. Tampa, 137 Fla. 29, 187 So. 604
(1939).
89FLA. STAT. §103.09 (1949), enacted as Fla. Laws 1931, c. 14715, §9, repealed
by Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26870, §9.
90FLA. STAT. §100.261 (1951), enacted as Fla. Laws 1945, c. 22545.
91Fla. Spec. Acts 1949, c. 25790, applying to Duval County only.
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the permanent registration act. A majority of those reregistering favored issuance of the bonds, and over fifty percent of the freeholders
voting at that election voted for issuances; but the total number of
voters constituted a minority of those entitled to vote before passage
of the special act.
The validity of that special act was strenuously contested in the
Supreme Court, which without opinion affirmed a decree validating
the bonds. The effect of that approval is now becoming apparent. The
1951 Legislature authorized county commissioners "at any time" to
call for a reregistration of freeholder electors solely "for the purpose of
securing a new and up-to-date list" to be used in any election called
for the purpose of approving an issuance of bonds.92 The new list
supersedes all prior lists of qualified voters at subsequent bond elections. Similar legislation relating to cities was introduced in 1953.
In this way the purpose of the constitutional amendment will be
greatly restricted, if not nullified by a statute.
Freeholders are further handicapped in bond elections by the decision that owners of homesteads can vote even though their property
is completely exempt from taxation. 93 Thus many a homestead owner
can participate in creating bonded debt from which he expects benefit
without assuming responsibility for payment of any part of it, and
in imposing the liability upon owners of property not fully exempt,
regardless of whether they receive any benefit from the improvement.
Revenue Bonds- Pledge of Net Profit
Repair or Improvement of Existing Facility. In 1933 the City of
Miami owned a waterworks plant that had become inadequate and
was badly in need of repair and modernization. The plant was earning a profit. The city proposed to issue revenue bonds payable solely
from the net revenues derived from future operations of the plant,
the proceeds to be expended for enlarging and improving it. The
Supreme Court approved issuance of those bonds without a prior
election by freeholders, provided the bonds did not create a debt
enforceable against the city or against any of its taxes or tax resources. 94
§97.81 (1951).
CONsr. Art. X, §7, Lersch v. Board of Pub. Instr., 121 Fla. 621, 164 So.
281 (1935). This amendment, not adopted until 1934, virtually removed owners
of exempt realty from the class of freeholders for purposes of public responsibility,
yet not, as the amendment was interpreted, for purposes of control.
94State v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6 (1933).
92FLA. STAT.
93FLA.
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The opinion contains a wealth of citations to cases from other
states but fails to define "the precise scope of our constitutional prohibition." It first disposes of the argument that the amendment
recognizes no exceptions to the word "bond." At the time the amendment was adopted, it said, a large number of municipalities had long
established the policy of owning and operating water, light, and other
plants for the benefit of their inhabitants; these operations have many
of the attributes of private business; and, since the Legislature and
the people of the state knew this to be true, the provision that bonds
can not be issued without the approving vote of freeholders has no
application to the form of "municipal financing required to be done
in order to keep municipal utilities in operation."9 5 As long as such
financing is based solely on the security of future revenues and the
object of borrowing the money is to enlarge the plant or make it
more efficient and economical, submission of the question to freeholders is unnecessary. The Court made it clear, however, that if no
such election be held the certificates can not obligate the city to levy
or collect any form of tax or to use taxes or other corporate funds to
pay the obligations, and that the certificates must be payable solely
out of "the net proceeds from the operation of the particular properties owned by the city in its proprietary capacity."9 6 Obligations
of this kind are not city "bonds" and do not create "a debt" of the
city within the purview either of its debt limit or the requirements
of Section 6 of Article IX.
Later the Court amplified this theory. It held that the power of a
city to anticipate future revenues to make improvements is "an ordinary and usual function of fiscal management incident to the city's
authority to own and operate its waterworks," so long at it does not
mortgage, pledge, or obligate the plant or the taxing power of the
city.97 Carrying this reasoning further, it held that the city officers in
charge of a plant are in the nature of a board of directors of a private
corporation and have full power to act as such "to the extent they are
not restrained by law,"' 8 inasmuch as questions of policy and business
judgment should not be subject to control by voters of the community.
Following these decisions the Court validated numerous issues of
revenue bonds of this type, payable from the net income of municipally
951d. at 296, 152 So. at 12.
C6d. at 299, 152 So. at 13.
97State v. Daytona Beach, 118 Fla. 29, 40, 158 So. 300, 304 (1934).
981d. at 41, 158 So. at 805.
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owned utilities, provided the money borrowed was to be expended for
the enlargement or improvement thereof. 9 In several it expressly
held, as it had done in the Hopkins case 100 with state bonds, that
the burden was on the municipality to prove that the plant was
earning sufficient net income to enable it to pay operating, maintenance, and debt service costs, including the additional charges incurred from the new debt.' 0'
Acquisition or Construction of New Facility. For a time the Court
held that whenever funds are borrowed to acquire or construct a
wholly new project, or whenever any municipal property or taxes
other than the "net revenue" are pledged or used to pay the debt, no
instruments evidencing indebtedness for such borrowed funds can
legally be issued until after approval by the freeholder electors. 10 2
Later it modified that conclusion. For many years it has validated,
without election, issues of revenue bonds to build entirely new projects, utilities, or facilities that have no history of earnings, resting its
approval upon estimates of net revenue from operations sufficient to
9DThe annotations to FLA. CONsr. Art. IX, §6, list a large number of such
cases. See also Note, 146 A.L.R. 329 (1943).
l00Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649, 167 So. 677 (1936).
201E.g., Brash v. State Tuberculosis Board, 124 Fla. 652, 656, 169 So. 218, 219
(1936): "The fundamental issue in propositions of this kind now before the Court
is one of ultimate tax burden, whether mediate or immediate, present or remote.
Ordinarily such an issue can only be decided in each case as it arises, especially
where the border line of constitutional power and authority is closely approached
as it must be in every instance where a new capital venture is proposed to be
embarked upon with borrowed money procured largely on the contemplated
funding of visionary expectations of revenues derivable from unproven revenue

sources other than taxes." Cf. Fort Lauderdale v. Kraft, 155 Fla. 738, 21 So.2d
461 (1945); Kathleen Citrus Land Co. v. Lakeland, 124 Fla. 659, 169 So. 356 (1936);
Williams v. Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936).
102E.g., Williams v. Dunnellon, supra note 101 at 124, 169 So. at 635:

"But if

funds are to be borrowed for the acquisition of a new municipal project, utility
or facility, which was not in use when the organic amendment was adopted, or
if any municipal property or tax resource, other than the net receipts derived
from the operation of the public utility or facility, is to be in any way whatever
pledged or used for the acquisition of a new project, utility or facility, or for the
maintenance, improvement or extension of an existing public facility or utility,
no instruments evidencing indebtedness for such borrowed funds, can legally be
issued by or for the state if the instruments are in legal effect 'state bonds' . . .
or be issued by or for a county, district, or municipality, under statutory authority,
until after an approval vote of the freeholder electors of the unit as mandatorily
required ......
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meet, without resort to taxation: (a) the cost of operation, (b) maintenance, and (c) the debt incurred.103
All such cases dearly proceed on the assumption that the purchaser
of the bonds assumes the risk that the expected revenue may not be
realized. The Court has adhered to its position that any doubt as to
the sufficiency of the revenue to pay the obligations being incurred
must be resolved against the power of the city or county to issue them
0
without prior approval by the freeholders.1 4
Pledge of Gross Revenue. Several decisions have approved issues
of revenue bonds secured by pledge of the gross revenue of a project. 0 5
In one case the city pledged the proceeds of the utility service tax
in addition to the gross revenue from the project or utility, and the
decision allowed both funds to be pledged without freeholder election.106 In another, involving the legality of a pledge of gross revenue,
the Court disposed of the case by merely saying that the answer to the
petition for validation showed available revenues sufficient to pay the
cost of operation and create a surplus for other purposes in addition
to paying the required debt service. It concluded: ". . . at any rate,
if such a contingency [nothing left to pay operating expenses] should
arise, and any attempt should be made to pay the cost of such administration by the imposition of ad valorem taxes, it would then
0 7
be time to raise this question by suit to enjoin the taxes.'1
It is difficult to see how securities left in such position as this could
be sold to advantage in the regular market, for neither the bondholders nor the taxpayers nor the city itself could know what their rights
were or would be if the gross revenue from the golf course and clubhouse should later prove to be insufficient to pay expenses of operation
lO3Net revenue of a facility was pledged to secure bond issues in, e.g., State v.
Key West, 153 Fla. 226, 14 So.2d 707 (1943) (purchase of electric system); State
v. Dade County, 146 Fla. 331, 200 So. 848 (1941) (construction of causeway); Trudnak v. Gustafson, 133 Fla. 834, 183 So. 494 (1938) (acquisition of municipal piers
and wharves); State v. Hollywood, 131 Fla. 584, 179 So. 721 (1938) (erection of new
waterworks); Board of County Comm'rs v. Herrick, 123 Fla. 619, 167 So. 386 (1936)
(acquisition of new water system). See also note 101 supra.
104E.g., Fort Lauderdale v. Kraft, supra note 101; Neff v. Jacksonville, 139
Fla. 179, 190 So. 468 (1939); Kathleen Citrus Land Co. v. Lakeland, supra note
101.
105E.g., Wolfe v. Fort Lauderdale, 47 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1950); State v. Winter
Park, 160 Fla. 330, 34 So.2d 740 (1948).
lo6State v. Winter Park, 160 Fla. 330, 34 So.2d 740 (1948).
.07Wolfe

v. Fort Lauderdale, 47 So.2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1950).
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and maintenance plus the debt service on the bonds. The opinion
did not indicate how the actual expense of operating the clubhouse
could be paid, with all the gross revenue pledged to debt service.
There would be no fund out of earnings from which salaries and other
expenses necessary to operate it could be paid; nor would there be any
fund available to pay the cost of maintaining the property. All
revenue would belong to the bondholders.
The question can not be regarded as academic. The Court has
held that, if the authorizing resolution includes conditions that can be
used to ". . . indirectly coerce the city, either through a sense of moral
or legal obligation, to exert its governmental authority to raise a
fund to save the corporate property and continue its operation in the
interest of the peace, health and convenience of the people . . " the
bonds can not be issued unless first approved by the freeholders108
In particular the Court has held that giving a mortgage or lien serves
to coerce the city into paying the obligation in order to save its
property. 0 The obligations are void without an election, because
Section 6 was intended to prohibit the issuance of securities that could
result in the levy of a tax on property.
Relation of Revenue Bonds to Article IX, Section 6. In one of
the first cases to arise after the amendment was adopted the Supreme
Court said:110
"After the collapse of the boom and the return to a more sane
condition of the public mind, there arose a strong sentiment
among the people that no further bonded indebtedness should
be issued or incurred without first securing the approval of
a majority of the voters of the people upon whom the burden
would fall."
A recent opinion"' implies the same conclusion.
The amendment has, therefore, recognized a constitutional right
in all freeholders that they shall be given an opportunity to vote on
lOSKathleen Citrus Land Co. v. Lakeland, 124 Fla. 659, 682, 169 So. 356, 366

(1936).
loDE.g., Neff v. Jacksonville, supra note 104; Broward County Port Authority
v. State, 129 Fla. 73, 175 So. 796 (1937); State v. Calhoun County, 125 Fla. 263, 169
So. 673 (1936); Boykin v. River Junction, 121 Fla. 902, 164 So. 558 (1935).
110Sullivan v. Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 314, 134 So. 211, 217 (1931).
"'State v. Florida State Imp'vt Comm'n, 60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1952).
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the issue of any municipal, county, or other bonds that may result
in the levy of a tax against their property. And this is true whether
the liability of the issuing authority be direct, as the result of an
obligation of the city to pay out of its general funds, or indirect, as
the result of a contingent obligation to levy an unlimited ad valorem
tax. Quite recently the Court reversed a validating decree because of
an agreement in the resolution that the county, if the proceeds from
the race track funds should prove insufficient, would levy ad valorem
taxes not exceeding three mills on the dollar in order to provide
the funds necessary to meet debt service requirements. 12 The question is not whether a fixed or direct liability is incurred; it is whether
property may be subjected to taxes. Once the contract is executed,
no circumstances can change its legal effect, however doubtful this
may be prior to judicial construction.
If, therefore, the resolution includes conditions that "indirectly
coerce the city" to "raise a fund" or to resort to its general funds in
order to save the corporate property and continue operation of the
project in the interest of its own people or of the creditors, the debt
can not be incurred unless approved by the freeholders. A city
that has pledged all of the gross revenue of a project is obviously
coerced into paying the cost of operation and maintenance out of
funds other than revenue from the project. There can be no revenue
from the project unless it is operated, that is, unless someone collects
the revenue. Nor can the project continue if not repaired or maintained physically; it soon becomes unusable.
An express contract of the city, in the resolution, to pay the costs
of operation, maintenance, and repair out of its general funds is but
a part of the bond contract; the very insertion of such an agreement
admits that the project is doubtful and therefore should not be approved by judicial fiat alone. Approval by the freeholders is logically
essential, inasmuch as the obligation incurred may well result in a
tax levy against their property. Even if the resolution does not contain an express contract to pay the operating and maintenance expense the result is the same; the city is still subject to the same moral
coercion to operate and maintain the property, even though no enforceable legal obligation exists.
The very fact that the bonds are called "revenue" bonds indicates
that payment of them is not guaranteed by the issuer but depends upon
the existence of sufficient net revenue in the special fund. When1l21bid.
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ever the city agrees to pay the expense of operation or maintenance,
or both, that agreement means, in effect, that the city will increase
the gross revenue out of its general fund; and accordingly it destroys
the distinguishing feature of a revenue bond, namely, that the bondholder assumes the risk of nonpayment due to insufficient revenue.
It is almost universal practice to require payment of all expenses
out of gross revenue first, the security for the debt being the "net"
income - the amount remaining.
The earlier cases dealing with the validity of revenue bonds involved only the financing of improvements or additions to public
utilities or other revenue-producing projects constructed for public
use. If the gross income therefrom be insufficient to pay the cost of
operation, maintenance, and debt service, the project is not sound
as a proprietary enterprise and does not come within the reasons
given by the Court for making the issuance of revenue bonds an exception to the unqualified language of Section 6.
Financing the entire cost of a new project by revenue bonds should
be the extreme limit, legally and practically, for the use of revenue
bonds. The fixed charges on such a debt are necessarily larger, because the debt is larger, than they are for mere increase or improvement of an existing plant. When a plant has a history of substantial
earned revenue its financial future can be more surely predicted, and
the risk of default is small. This fact was clearly recognized by the
Court in its early decisions disapproving revenue bond financing of
new projects. 113 Liberality toward public finance is always popular
until a period of reaction or recession in business activity occurs.
Defaults follow, with all their attendant damage. The present generation still recalls - though less vividly than it did - the damages that
resulted from the 1929 depression and how unpopular the original
advocates of bonded debts became when the taxes necessary to pay
these became a real burden.
The Court has never approved an issue of city bonds payable
solely from charges levied or collected from the exercise of its governmental or police powers. Recently it reversed the validation of
14
stockade bonds payable solely from the city's fine and forfeiture fund.
Although the opinion did not expressly say so, we may assume that
the Court refused to include fines and forfeitures within the term
"revenue" to the city in the sense used in the opinions. Revenue
"'3See discussion in Williams v. Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936).
'l4SCe pp. 309, 310 supra.
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bonds are properly payable from only "the net proceeds from the
operation of the particular properties owned by the city in its proprietary capacity." 115
So long as the Court adhered to its original theory and restricted
the issue of revenue bonds unapproved by freeholders to obligations
to borrow money with which to enlarge, improve, or extend an existing public utility or project operated for hire to the public, secured
by a pledge of the net income earned by that utility or project, no
injury could result to the credit of municipalities and no burden could
be placed upon taxpayers. Issuance to finance new projects can also
be safeguarded, if the official judgment be sound and the validation
record contain proof, even though by estimates, that the bonds will
not require the levy of a tax. Without such proof the issuing authority
should be required to submit the matter to vote of the freeholders,
so that those liable for such tax as may be levied will have an opportunity to vote upon the issue. This mandate is not only a constitutional right of each freeholder but also accords with equity and
justice.
Excise Tax Bonds
In one of its most recent opinions the Court referred to two exceptions to Section 6: (1) bonds payable out of the revenue from
the project financed with the loan, and (2) securities issued under the
Tapers rule.116 That opinion, however, omitted reference to judicial
approval of the issuance of still another type of municipal bond
without an election of freeholders: a bond payable solely out of the
proceeds of a city excise tax, such as the utility service tax authorized
by statute.1 17 That statute contains no provision that would prevent
its repeal by any subsequent Legislature and does not expressly authorize a city to pledge the tax proceeds to secure payment of bonds."18
'l5State v. Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 299, 152 So. 6, 13 (1933).
l16See p. 310 supra.
"-FLA. STAT.

§167.43 (1951).

118The first case authorizing pledge of a municipal excise tax was State v.
Winter Park, supra note 106, which, however, treated the question by merely
citing as authority previous cases permitting the pledge of the gas tax, race track
tax, and other funds received by the city otherwise than by the exercise of its own
taxing power. The next case was Schmeller v. Fort Lauderdale, 38 So.2d 36 (Fla.
1948), permitting the city to pledge a utilities service tax. The majority, relying
on the Winter Park case, upheld the bonds in the face of a strong dissent by
Adams, J. (at p. 39):
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Nevertheless the Court held that a city can pledge such proceeds and
that, if it does, the Legislature cannot repeal the enabling act, since
to do so would impair the obligation of the contract.119 In another
case it allowed a city to pledge its share of the state cigarette tax to
secure bonds, although it did not add that the state could not repeal
the authorizing act. 20 The opinion indicates that the proceeds of
such bonds can be used for any municipal purpose.
The Court has not explained why these obligations are not "bonds"
or why no election is required by Section 6; we must therefore assume
the reason to be that the bonds are payable solely from a "special
fund" derived from the proceeds of an excise tax and that they are
not general obligations of the city and do not obligate it to levy ad
valorem taxes for the payment thereof. The "special fund" theory,
which has been accepted by many courts, is that obligations payable
solely from a special fund do not constitute "debts" of the issuing
"The Constitution speaks of bonds. It is not limited to that class of bonds
secured by ad valorem taxation. They come under our definition of bonds in
the case of Leon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666.
"It is stated in the resolution that the issuance of these bonds is essential for
the public health and recreation of the citizens of the City. No excuse is given
for not complying with the Constitution by procuring the approval of the qualified electors despite the necessity to procure facilities for public health and
recreation. These negotiable instruments are characterized by the City as bonds.
They have every attribute of bonds. The sovereign taxing power is pledged to
them.
"Heretofore when revenue certificates were issued for self-liquidating projects
the citizens or person paying the charge could exercise a choice of using the
service and paying or declining to do so- such as living in a dormitory at one
of our state institutions. Such is not the case here. Each user of the public utility
is taxed to pay these bonds. It is strange indeed that these bonds are so vital and
yet the people who must pay them are not given the opportunity to pass upon them
as provided in their Constitution. A case like this is a reminder of another case
now before this Court where we are urged to apply equitable principles and
reduce the bondholders' recovery to the prices paid for them on a depressed
market rather than par. The situation bids us pause and be sure that the Constitutional amendment, drafted to curb the abuse of incurring public debt, has
been complied with."
119State v. Pensacola, 40 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1949).
120State v. Homestead, 59 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1952); cf. State v. Jacksonville, 53
So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951) (bonds payable from recreation fund supplied by utilities

taxes and possibly other sources); State v. Bartow, 48 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1950); State
v. Pensacola, 43 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1949) (revenue, amusement and tobacco taxes);
State v. Daytona Beach, 42 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1949) (utilities tax); State v. Lakeland,
42 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1949) (utilities tax).
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authority, chargeable against the constitutional or statutory maximum
amount of debt that a city may create. But there is no such unanimity
among courts in the application of that theory to state obligations,
121
because of the differences in the various state constitutions.
Prior to the 1930 amendment Section 6 expressly limited the power
of the Legislature either to issue or to authorize the issue of "state
bonds" for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection. It did not expressly or by implication make a distinction
between the issue of "special fund" obligations and "general" obligations of the state; and the Supreme Court has not recognized any
such distinction in its construction of this section. On the contrary,
it has held all state obligations void - even those made payable from
the proceeds of an excise tax such as the state gasoline tax - on the
ground that they violated Section 6.
The only change made by the 1930 amendment was the addition
of a clause limiting the power of counties, cities, and districts to issue
bonds; therefore the original intent of Section 6 to limit the power
of the state to incur bonded debt was not altered by that amendment.
It must be presumed that the Legislature in proposing that amendment, and the people in adopting it, ratified and approved the
judicial construction already given to this section. Regardless of
whether the amendment authorizes cities and counties to issue bonds
payable from excise taxes without holding an election, therefore, it
is clear that the state cannot issue bonds payable from excise taxes
except for the two purposes stated unless expressly authorized to do
so by amendment to the Constitution.
Decisions that no election is necessary for issuance of city bonds
payable solely from the proceeds of specific excise taxes stem from the
view that Section 6 applies to only those bonds that constitute general obligations or that are secured by pledge of ad valorem levies.
This premise is consistent with the reason given by the Court for
the adoption of the amendment, namely, to permit those whose property is encumbered by the taxes to decide whether to incur the debt.
Since an excise tax, on the other hand, is paid by the public generally,
there is no reason for limiting control of a pledge of its proceeds to
a minority of qualified electors; in fact, to let all qualified electors
vote on bonds of this type is logical.
12lThis theory is briefly outlined in 38 AM. JU., Municipal Corporations §468.
See also Note, 100 A.L.R. 900 (1936).
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SUMMARY

The foregoing review of Florida constitutional and statutory
provisions, and of the decisions of our Supreme Court, leads to certain
principles that can be stated in summary fashion.
State Bonds
1. Florida as a state can not issue any "bonds" at all except (a) to
suppress insurrections; (b) to repel invasion; and (c) pursuant to
Article IX, Section 16, and Article XII, Section 18, of the Constitution.
2. A state agency can issue "revenue bonds" if their payment is
limited solely to net income from a proprietary project constructed
with borrowed money, the income from which is received solely from
"outside sources" and not from taxes or any other exercise of state
power.
3. Any obligation or debt of a state agency, secured by tax proceeds, even if payable out of a "special fund" created by the state
from state resources, is a state bond and is prohibited by Article IX,
Section 6, unless issued for one of the two purposes enumerated in
that section 22 or pursuant to a specific constitutionally authorized
exception.
County Bonds
1. Counties are political subdivisions and may issue bonds for
such county purposes as are authorized by state statutes, including
the building of hard-surfaced roads, courthouses, jails, and other county
buildings.
2. Counties can not issue bonds secured by pledge of ad valorem
taxes without an election 123 for any purpose other than to finance the
construction of a courthouse or jail.124
3. Counties can not issue bonds for the benefit of private corporations, or levy taxes therefor, or lend their credit thereto.
222The third original purpose, that of refunding the then-existing debt, no
longer exists; all of that debt has been paid.
123Art IX, §6, provides that approval of the freeholders must first be secured
at an election. The tax is levied against all taxable property in the county at
not more than 5 mills per year for not more than 15 consecutive years.
lZ4See p. 309 supra.
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4. The characterization "public purpose," for which a county may
levy taxes or be authorized to issue bonds, is initially determined by
the Legislature but subject to review by the courts.
5. Counties owning a public facility may borrow money for the
purpose of enlarging, improving, or extending it or its service and may
secure the loan by pledge of its net revenue, provided the county
prove that such revenue is sufficient to pay operation, maintenance,
and debt service costs, including those accruing on the new issue.
6. Counties may finance the construction of a new utility or other
proprietary project by the issue of bonds payable solely from the net
revenue of the utility or project to be constructed with the borrowed
money, subject to the conditions stated in the preceding paragraph.
City Bonds
1. The Legislature has plenary power under the Constitution to
organize and abolish cities and to regulate their affairs by general or
special act.
2. The power of cities to issue bonds and levy taxes is subject
to the limitations as to purpose stated above with reference to counties.
3. Cities can not issue general obligation bonds or bonds payable
out of ad valorem taxes without first securing approval at an election
of freeholders held in accordance with the provisions of Article IX,
Section 6.
4. Cities owning a utility may borrow money for the purpose of
enlarging, improving, or extending it or its service and may secure
the loan by pledge of its net revenue, provided the city proves that
such revenue is sufficient to pay operation, maintenance, and debt
service costs, including those accruing on the new issue.
5. Cities may finance the construction of a new utility or other
municipal proprietary project by the issue of bonds payable solely
from the net revenue of the utility or project to be constructed with
the borrowed money, subject to the conditions stated in the preceding
paragraph.
6. Cities may issue bonds for municipal purposes and may make
them payable solely from the proceeds of a city excise tax if the
Legislature authorizes the levy; and in such event an election by the
freeholders is not a condition precedent.
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CONCLUSION

The 1930 amendment to Article IX, Section 6, extending constitutional restrictions to counties, cities, and districts, was intended, as
was the original section, to prevent a recurrence of a condition resulting from the lack of adequate limitations upon the power of the
Legislature. In particular, as the Supreme Court has said, the amendment was adopted to prevent the future credit of governmental units
from being pledged without the approving vote of the freeholders the people whose property is liable for the debt.

25

Bonds that do or

may impose the levy of an ad valorem tax must be submitted to a vote
of the freeholders, who have a constitutional right to decide whether
such debt shall be created.
Revenue bonds must be payable from only the "net revenue" of
a project, facility, or utility, publicly owned and operated in a proprietary capacity. Bonds payable from excise taxes alone are not
revenue bonds; but neither are they "bonds" of the city within the
purview of Section 6.
The Court should, therefore, examine carefully all proposed issues
of "revenue" bonds to determine whether the authorizing resolution
contains provisions under which the city or county or its taxpayers
will become liable to the bondholders. The Court has recognized
this duty by placing upon the issuing authority the burden of proving
that its proceeding does not and will not result in a violation of the
constitutional right of the freeholders to decide upon the creation
of general secured obligations. The recent decisions on revenue bonds
apply this rule.
The Court has for so many years enforced bonds and their covenants that it should not approve an issue either (1) when a tax levy
may be required or the city may become liable generally under any
covenant contained in the resolution or bond, or (2) when the sufficiency of the revenue to pay the debt is in doubt. If such doubt
exist, the unwillingness of the issuing authority to submit the question
to the voters should in itself be sufficient to justify the Court in requiring proof in order to decide the question.
Validation cases should be treated realistically. The proceeding
is not an efficient substitute for a litigated cause. State attorneys
receive no added compensation for services in such matters; their
'12 See note 110 supra and text thereat.
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interest is primarily in criminal law, and most of them have had little
experience in municipal bond law. Yet the suit lies against the state
in its sovereign capacity under a claim of right by a subdivision or
state agency to obligate the taxpayers to pay a debt. The decree is
conclusive against the state, the issuing subdivision, and its taxpayers.
In the great majority of cases the taxpayers assume that the public
authorities are not abusing their power. Ordinarily the taxpayer has
no reason to intervene and incur the expense and ill will of officials.
No such reason will arise if the Court will require issuing authorities
to demonstrate that they have the authority to take the proposed
action.
Many appeals are taken by state attorneys from validating decrees
at the request of city or county authorities in order to secure a final
decision by the Supreme Court on some doubtful question of law
and thereby render the bonds immune from subsequent attack. Too
often the briefs filed by these appellants do not include the type of
argument that would have been made if the case were in fact an
adversary proceeding-a real contest. On the contrary, the proceeding partakes of the nature of a request for an advisory opinion.
The Court should, therefore, either require the appellants to make a
full presentation of the issues of law and fact upon which the appeal
rests; or it should dismiss the appeal without prejudice; or, at least,
when it affirms the decree below it should confine its decision to the
case presented. The decision is res judicata against parties to the
specific cause as regards the issues involved; but neither the decision
nor the opinion should be accorded the same weight as a precedent
that is given to decisions in a real contest between adversaries in fact.
Only in this way can the Court preserve the uniformity of opinion and
decision and create the confidence essential to the free flow of securities in the public market.*

*Editors' Note: This article was completed before the decision in Gate City
Garage, Inc. v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953). This radical change in
Florida law, effected by a 5-2 decision, is analyzed in detail in this issue by Dauer
and Miller, Municipal Charters in Florida, under the subhead Public Housing
in V, 4.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 2
LEGAL ASPECTS OF BOND FINANCING
329
TABLE OF HEADINGS AND SUBHEADINGS

Judicial Enforcement of Bond Obligations ....
Florida's Early Economic Difficulties ....

..........

288

...........

291

State Bonds ....
..................
The Constitutions of 1868 and 1885 ...
..........
Judicial Interpretation of Constitutional Limitations ..
......
Exceptions by Constitutional Amendment ...
.........
Road Bonds-Article XII, Section 16 ...
.........
School Bonds-Article XII, Section 18 ...
.........
School Bonds-Article XII, Sections 17, 9 ...
......
Constitutional Amendments Limiting Sources of State Revenue .
Exception by Judicial Interpretation- Revenue Bonds ..
......
County Bonds ........
.................
Pre-1930 Road Bonds .......
...............
Courthouses and Jails- From Leon County to Tapers........
Bar of Ad Valorem Tax Pledge without Freeholder Vote .......
Bar of Police Power Revenue Pledge without Freeholder Vote .

.

.

.

.

292
293
294
297
297
298
299
300
301

305
305
306
.. 309
. 309

City Bonds .........
..................
310
Public versus Private Purpose- Article IX, Section 10 ..
......
311
Freeholder Vote on Debt Encumbering Property - Article IX, Section 6 . 313
Revenue Bonds- Pledge of Net Profit ....
..........
315
Repair or Improvement of Existing Facility ..
........
315
Acquisition or Construction of New Facility ..
........
317
Pledge of Gross Revenue .....
.............
318
Relation of Revenue Bonds to Article IX, Section 6 ..
......
319
Excise Tax Bonds .......
...............
322
Summary .........
Conclusion

.

...................
..

..

.

C ...

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol6/iss3/2

325

.

.

.........

327

44

